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Abstract: A retail store can profitably commit to the lowest prices because that allows it to 
take significantly greater market share. If a discount store acquires a competing convenience 
store, the average retail price tends to go up. When the upstream market is oligopolistic, the 
discounter can exert buyer power in the upstream market and thus earn even more profits. 
That also allows the discounter to lower its competitors’ profit margins and sales. The 
average retail price goes down because the buyer power leads to more sales through the 
discounter. However, the consumers as a whole may not better off, and the social welfare 
decreases.  
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1. Introduction 
An important development in retailing industries in the last few decades is the polarization of 
store sizes. Large-scale discounters and small convenience or specialty stores were squeezing 
traditional mid-sized general retailers out of the marketplace (Griffith and Krampf (1997)). 
Particularly, the “big-box” retailers, like Wal-Mart, Carrefour, Home Depot and Tesco, are 
taking increasing market shares in the industries. A usual economic measure of market power 
is the Lerner Index: firms with greater Lerner Index are often viewed having greater market 
power. But in retail industries, the biggest players often offer lower prices, or even lower 
profit margins than their competitors. According to Yahoo! Finance (June, 2005), the gross 
profit margins of four competing supermarket companies are: Kroger 24.12%, Albertson’s 
28.03%, Safeway 29.36%, and Wal-Mart 22.99%. Wal-Mart, which is the largest retailer on 
earth, actually has the lowest gross profit margin. From this perspective, Lerner index does 
not appear to be a good measure of retailer market power. 
Then how exactly the large retailers exert their market power? If exerting retailer market 
power leads to lower market prices, maybe the accumulation of retailer market power is 
desirable, particularly for consumers. Indeed, Galbraith (1952) suggests that the market 
power on one side of a market “create an incentive to the organization of another position of 
power that neutralizes it” (page 119). A demonstration of countervailing power suggested by 
Galbraith is the large retail organizations such as the major chain stores. By exerting the 
countervailing power, these retailers are able to obtain lower wholesale prices from the 
manufacturers and then pass the savings to consumers. The notion of “countervailing power” 
has been criticized by several economists (Whitney (1953), Stigler (1954), and Hunter 1958)),   4
who argue that the powerful retailers do not have incentive to pass their cost savings to 
consumers. Hence the so-called countervailing power may not really exist. Probably 
influenced by the countervailing power theory, the competition authorities of the United 
Kingdom are largely impassive toward the increase in concentration in retail industry. 
However, the United States tends to be hostile to the mergers and acquisitions of large 
retailers. They take the view that the buyer power of large retailers allows them to obtain 
lower wholesale prices from suppliers, which constitutes a type of price discrimination that is 
illegal under Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 (Dobson and Waterson (1997)).  
There was considerable interest in discount stores back to 1950s and 1960s, following the 
emergence of “discount house” during that period. For examples, Gilchrist (1953) finds 
“some form of discount selling is inevitable so long as manufacturers follow resale price 
maintenance polices,” based on his interviews with 550 consumers, 20 discounters, numerous 
dealers, department stores, and distributors in Los Angeles; DeLoach (1962) discusses the 
principal factors causing the spread of discount pricing and the practical limitations on a 
continuous increase in the number of discount stores; Minichiello (1967) surveys the 
operation of discount food stores, based on the practices of three non-competing companies 
active both in food discounting and in conventional supermarket operations. Those studies 
are either conceptual or empirical discussion, but not theoretic analysis. The operation 
mechanism of discount stores is not rigorously analyzed in this stream of literature.  
There are also substantial studies on “Every Day Low Price” or promotional strategies. 
For examples, Chakravarthi (1988) explores the equilibrium pricing strategies of branded 
products that enjoy a monopoly market protected from other firms and a common market in   5
which every one competes. It is shown that a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists with the 
firms’ prices randomizing over an interval, which constitutes a promotional strategy; Lal and 
Rao (1997) study the competition between two supermarkets to investigate the phenomenon 
of “Every Day Low Pricing” (EDLP). The two stores compete for two types of customers, 
time-constrained consumers and “cherry pickers,” through their choices of advertising, price, 
and service. Consumers buy a basket of two products. It is shown that under certain 
conditions, one firm adopting a promotional strategy and the other adopting an EDLP 
strategy is an equilibrium, even when the EDLP store does not have a cost advantage. 
Nevertheless, those studies focus on strategic behaviors of individual retail stores, but not 
particularly on discount stores. They cannot explain the polarization of store sizes in modern 
retail industries either.  
Studies of retailer market power in vertically separated industries often use monopoly-
oligopoly models. In those models, manufacturer firsts negotiate wholesale contracts with 
retailers, and then retailers compete for consumers. The studies often relate to the 
“countervailing power” hypothesis. In von Ungern-Sternberg (1996), a supplier (Nash) 
bargains with several retailers who engage in Cournot competition. It is found that a decrease 
in the number of retailers leads to an increase in equilibrium consumer price. But if the 
downstream is perfectly competitive, the reverse is true because the average costs of the firms 
decrease with the number of firms. Dobson and Waterson (1997) consider a model with Nash 
bargaining in upstream market and price competition in downstream market. They show that 
when retailer services are regarded as very close substitutes, consumer price fall close to the 
competitive level and social welfare increase with the decline in the number of retailers in the   6
market. This result is viewed as an evidence of countervailing power. But as commented by 
Chen (2003), this conclusion crucially depends on the assumption of linear pricing in 
wholesale. It is also pointed out that the model does not capture the feature of store size 
polarization in retail industries. Chen (2003) considers a monopoly-oligopoly where the 
downstream market has a price-setting dominant retailer and n price-taking fringe retailers. 
The supplier makes a take-it-or-leave offer to each of the fringe retailers, but negotiates with 
the dominant retailer over the transaction contract through two-person Nash bargaining. It is 
found that when the dominant retailer has stronger bargaining power, the supplier’s share of 
the joint profits decreases. As a result, the supplier lowers the wholesale price to the fringe 
retailers in order to boost the sales through them. The fall in wholesale price results in lower 
retail price. Hence a stronger dominant retailer leads to lower retail price. This is exactly what 
the countervailing power theory suggests. Chen (2003) exogenously models a dominant 
retailer in order to capture the feature of store size polarization in retail market. But the model 
may not be able to represent the retail competition very well because of the assumption of 
price-taking fringe retailers.   
In a monopoly-oligopoly model, since the upstream monopolist simultaneously bargains 
with all downstream retailers, it can maximize the industry profit first and then decides how 
to share the profit with the retailers. Otherwise the transaction contracts in the upstream 
market can be Pareto improved. The maximization of industry profit is often possible with 
two-part tariffs or more sophisticated schemes.
1 Hence in monopoly-oligopoly models, the 
                                                        
1 For example, Winter (1993) considers a monopoly-duopoly model where the retailers can provide demand-enhancing 
services. In order to maximize the industry profit, the manufacturer needs to induce the optimal retail prices and service 
levels. It is shown that two-part tariffs and resale price maintenance can be jointly used to achieve the first best outcome for 
the manufacturer.    7
retail prices may often be the monopoly prices, which are independent to the retailers’ market 
power. From this perspective, monopoly-oligopoly models may not be suitable for studying 
the effect of retailer market power on retail prices. It is thus desirable to use bilateral 
oligopoly models for this purpose.  
This paper offers a theory to understand retailer market power. It explains the polarization 
of store sizes in retail industries. The theory also casts new insight into the countervail power 
hypothesis. In the model, manufacturers produce substitute products that are sold through 
downstream retail stores. Consumers, who have unit demands, are living in different 
residential areas. They incur some transportation costs when they move between two areas. 
There is a store located in each area. Among them there is a store that is able to commit to 
offering the lowest price in the market. This store, which is called discount store, describes 
the role of Wal-Mart, Carrefour or Tesco in the real world. The retail stores engage in price 
competition with spatial differentiation.  
In Section 2 of the paper, I consider the case with competitive upstream manufacturers 
and oligopolistic downstream retailers. In this case, all retailers face the same wholesale price, 
which equals to the marginal production cost of the good. It is shown that the discount store 
takes significantly greater market share and earns more profits than the other stores. 
Intuitively, because the discounter offers the lowest price, all consumers who have low 
enough transportation costs would buy from the discounter. The discounter can thus sell 
much more than the other stores. From another perspective, the discount store competes with 
many convenience stores, while each convenience store only directly competes with the 
discounter. It is also shown that if the discounter acquires a competing convenience store, the   8
average retail price tends to go up. Hence the accumulation of retailer market power is 
unlikely to be good to consumers. An interesting implication is that the store that offers the 
lowest prices may be exactly the one that drives retail prices up.  
In Section 3, I consider the case where the upstream market is duopolistic rather than 
competitive. The configurations of consumers and store locations are the same as those in the 
previous model. I define “channel fees” as the fees that manufacturers pay retailers in order to 
encourage them carrying their products. Banning the use of channel fees, the retail prices 
reflect the “sum” of the degree of product differentiation and the degree of store location 
differentiation. That means greater retailer market power brought by greater degree of store 
location differentiation necessarily leads to higher retail prices. This result does not support 
the “countervailing power” hypothesis. If demanding channel fees are allowed, the discount 
retailer can exert buyer power in the upstream market through the fees.
2 The discounter is 
particularly interested in demanding channel fees that are positive related to sale volumes, 
because that allows it to raise the wholesale prices faced by the other stores and thus lower 
their profit margins and market shares. The discounter, on the contrary, achieves greater profit 
margins and market shares. Hence the channel fees of the discounter have exclusionary effect 
against the other retailers. This paper thus partially endorses the insight of Dobson (2005): 
“…smaller retailers face increased price differentials from what might amount to a 
‘waterbed’ effect in which low purchase prices for the major retailers force suppliers to 
                                                        
2 Based primarily on the grocery business in the United Kingdom, Dobson (2005) studies the buyer power of large retailers 
in grocery trade. Dobson finds that buying power in retailing arises from three roles played by retailers in relationship to 
suppliers: as the suppliers’ customer (when purchasing and re-selling the suppliers’ goods); as the suppliers’ competitor 
(when developing own-brand substitutes); and as a supplier to their suppliers (in providing shelf and advertising space). 
Those roles may give a large retailer great buyer power in the upstream market.    9
charge higher prices to smaller retailers in order to cover fixed costs.”
3   
The linear channel fees in the model raise the prices of the convenience stores but lower 
the prices of the discount store. The average retail prices decrease because more consumers 
buy from the discounter now. In this sense, we can say that the accumulation of retailer 
market power leads to an effect that is consistent with the “countervailing power” 
hypothesis—a discounter store passes the savings from lower wholesale prices to consumers. 
Notice that the critical circumstance for the “countervailing power” to arise is that the large 
retailer is a discounter and it faces competition from other stores. However, we cannot easily 
conclude that the consumers are better off with the channel fees. Since the low prices are 
available only in the discount store, the consumers as a whole have to pay higher 
transportation costs. The extra transportation costs may cancel out the consumers’ savings 
from the lower average retail prices. Also because of the increased transportation costs, the 
social welfare decreases when the discounter exerts buyer power in the upstream market.  
The “channel fee” defined in this paper has some similarity with the term of “slotting 
allowance”, which has been substantially discussed in the literature. I use this new term 
because “slotting allowances” are typically recognized as lump sum fees only, particularly the 
one-time fees charged for introducing new products to retailers’ stores.
4 The “channel fees” 
defined here need not be lump sum. Since slotting allowances are typically privately 
                                                        
3 However, this paper shows that the suppliers would charge higher prices to smaller retailers even if their fixed costs were 
zero. Smaller profit margins from selling to large retailers actually push the suppliers to extract more out of small retailers.  
This mechanism works even without fixed costs.  
4 In the literature, a school of researchers argues that slotting fees help to improve the distribution efficiency of retailing 
industry (Kelly (1991), Chu (1992), Lariviere and Padmanabhan (1997) and Sullivan (1997)). It is argued that slotting fees 
can be used by manufacturers to signal the quality of newly introduced products, or by retailers to screen the products that 
are suitable for them to stock. Another school of researchers finds that requiring slotting allowances is an exercise of market 
powers by large retailers (Shaffer (1991)) or powerful manufacturers (MacAvoy (1997)).    10
negotiated, empirical data on those fees are scarce. It is actually difficult to tell whether the 
allowances are lump sum or not in practice. According to a survey by the National Food and 
Agriculture Policy Project (NFAPP), 74 percent of produce shippers indicated that the 
demand for various fees and services has increased in recent years. Volume incentives, 
promotional allowances, and other forms of rebates topped the list of fees demanded by 
retailers. All of these allowances are tied to the volume of sales and have been a customary 
form of business for many years (NFAPP #01-04). This survey implies that the fees paid to 
marketing channels are often positively related to the volume of sales.  
 
2. The Model with a Competitive Upstream Market 
Consider the market for a product in a city. The manufacturers of the product are 
perfectly competitive, which means all downstream retailers face the same wholesale prices 
equaling to the marginal production cost of the good. The city has n ( 2 n ≥ ) residential areas. 
Each area has one continuum of consumers. The consumers incur no cost moving within an 
area. A consumer’s transportation costs of moving between any two areas are the same.
 5 The 
consumers’ inter-area transportation costs are evenly distributed on interval [0,T]. The 
consumers have unit demands with “high enough” reservation prices. Each area has a single 
store. Store j  has constant marginal costs of  j s , where  12 ... n ss s ≤ ≤≤.
6 Denote the retail 
                                                        
5 This assumption significantly simplifies the analyses. But it looks restrictive from geographic perspective. It can also be 
shown that the results of this paper hold when the assumption is significantly relaxed. As long as each consumer’s 
transportation costs from his/her home to different other areas are comparable, the results still hold. I omit the details here. 
On the other hand, the assumption can be roughly satisfied if the consumers’ transportation costs are less than proportional to 
geographic distances and the number of areas is not too large (say  10 n ≤ ).  
6 The marginal costs include the wholesale prices and the store’s marginal retailing costs. The wholesale prices are the same 
across the stores, but the retailing costs may not.    11
prices of the stores as  1,..., n p p . When there are only two stores, we have following 
equilibrium.  
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 consumers of area 2 will shop at store 1. Hence the stores’ 
profit functions are  
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Solve this equation system with respect to  1 p  and  2 p , we immediately obtain the equilibrium 
prices at stated in (1).  Q.E.D. 
 




 lower than the other store. It 
can be shown that the low cost store also earns more profit. The equilibrium of the market is 
structurally symmetric with respect to the marginal costs of the stores. However, this 
symmetry disappears when there are three or more stores.  
From now on we consider the case where  3 n ≥ . Assume that the marginal costs satisfy 
12 ... n ss ss ≤==≡  in order to simplify the exposition. I also assume that store 1, who has the 
lowest marginal retailing cost, is able to commit to the lowest price. Due to this assumption, 
an immediate implication of the modeling is that stores 2,..., j (directly) compete with store   12
1, but not with each other. Particularly, in area  j ,  {2, , } jn ∈ L , there are 




who buy the product from store 1 rather than store  j .  
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is the unique equilibrium strategy profile of the stores.  
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Each store  {2, , } jn ∈ L  chooses  j p  to solve problem   
j p Max 







−+ .                                                    (6) 






















= + ,  for  {2, , } jn ∈ L .                   (7) 






















,  for  {2, , } j n ∈ L , 












0 > , for any 
{2, , } j n ∈ L . This is consistent with the assumption that store 1 commits to the lowest price. 
Hence (4) describes the unique equilibrium pricing strategy profile of the stores.  Q.E.D. 
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Quantities 
o
j q  and profits 
o
j π ,  {1, 2, , } j n ∈ L , are respectively the equilibrium quantities and 
profits when  12 ... n ss s ===. All the inequalities hold strictly if   1 ss < .  
Proof: (See Appendix). 
 
Proposition 2 shows that store 1 offers significant lower price than all the other stores. It 
thus attracts consumers from all those areas. This is a structurally asymmetric equilibrium. It 
is not difficult to prove that this model does not have a symmetric equilibrium even when all 
stores have the same marginal costs (I skip the details here). From Corollary 1 we can see that 
the equilibrium market share of the discount store is more than 
1
3
, which is significantly 
greater than that of each other store. It is interesting that though the discount store offers 
significantly lower price, it earns more profit than the convenience stores. Hence committing 
to the lowest price is a profitable strategy of a retailer, even when all stores have the same 
marginal costs. However, there is only one store that can use this strategy in a certain region. 
This simple model explains why discount stores like Wal-Mart are so profitable. It also 
explains why other retailers can hardly duplicate Wal-Mart’s strategy unless they are strong 
enough to credibly undercut Wal-Mart’s low prices. Since stores 2, 3, …, n only serve their 
local customers, I call them convenience stores. 
At mentioned in the last section, the antitrust authorities hold rather different views   14
regarding the mergers and acquisitions in retail industries. It might be of interest to see what 
will happen if the discount store acquires a nearby convenience store. Now suppose that the 
discount store 1 acquires convenience store 2 and becomes a new store 1. The merged store is 
assumed to have the lowest marginal cost of  1 s . We have following proposition and corollary. 
The proofs are put in Appendix.  
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,  {3, , } jn ∈ L .                    (12) 
The inequalities hold strictly if   1 ss < .  
 
Corollary 2 When   1 ... n ss s = == , we have  
(1) The average market price increases with the merger;  
(2) If  10 ≤ n , the merger is profitable in the sense that the post-merger profit of the 
merged firm is higher than the sum of the merging firms’  premerger profits;  
(3) The post-merger sale of the merged firm is less than the sum of the merging firms’  
premerger sales;  
(4) The sale volumes of the non-merging stores increase.    15
 




1 p >  and 
** *
jj p p > ,  {3, , } jn ∈ L . 
Hence the acquisition of a convenience store by the discounter increases the retail prices of 
all stores, though it may lower the price available in area 2. Corollary 2 shows that the merger 
allows the non-merging convenience stores to sell more at higher prices. The average retail 
price goes up conditional on all stores having the same marginal costs. In this sense, market 
concentration in retail industry is unlikely to be good to consumers. However, the change in 
average price also depends on the degree of cost saving caused by the merger. Indeed, if  1 s  is 
much lower than s, it is possible that the merger leads to lower average price. Finally, recall 
that our model is more relevant when the number of areas is not too large. This is consistent 
with the result that the merger is profitable only when  10 ≤ n .  
 
3. The Model with a Duopolistic Upstream Market  
Based on the model of Section 2, in this section I assume that there are only two 
upstream manufacturers that produce substitute products. Denote the two manufacturers (as 
well as the two brands of the products) as a and b. Their marginal production costs are m. The 
consumers have unit demands with high enough reservation prices. Half of the consumers 
prefer each brand. If a consumer chooses her less preferred brand, her utility from the 
consumption decreases by x. The values of x across the consumers are evenly distributed on 
interval [0, J], where J is a positive parameter. The retailers cannot directly observe the 
consumers’ preferences. The consumers’ preferences over the two brands are independent to 
their location and transportation costs. The products are sold through n downstream stores 1,   16
2,…, n, which have marginal retailing costs of  12 , ,..., n ss s  respectively, with  12 ... n ss s ≤≤≤. 
Suppose store 1 is a discount store that can commit to the lowest price in the market. In order 
to simplify the exposition, I assume  12 ... n ss s = == s ≡ . It can be shown that the main results 
still hold if the discounter has strictly lower marginal cost than the other stores.   
We initially discuss a benchmark game: First, the manufacturers announce their 
wholesale prices, denoted as  a w  and  b w  respectively. Second, the stores order products from 
the manufacturers and determine their retail profit margins  j α ,  {1, , } jn ∈ L .
7 Finally, the 
consumers enter the market and determine which store to go and which brand to buy.  
A feature of the model is that the equilibria of the upstream and downstream markets can 
be solved separately. In the downstream market, it is easy to see that if the wholesale prices 
satisfy  ab ww − J ≥ , the stores only carry product b; If  ba ww − J ≥ , the stores only carry 
product a; If J < ab ww − J < , the stores carry both products. I omit the discussion of the first 
two cases since it can be shown that they never occur in equilibrium. Following proposition 
describes the equilibrium of the retail market.  
 












































, 2,..., j n = .                        (14) 
                                                        
7  Thus the retail prices in store j are  ja a j rw s α =+ +  and  jb b j rw s α = ++  respectively.  Generally, each store 
should be able to choose two strategic variables  ja α  and  jb α  for the two products. I assume the stores use a simple rule 
with  ja α = jb α j α =   in order to make the model tractable. This treatment is appropriate if the consumers can only 
perceive the overall price levels of the stores before they decide which store to go. In that case the stores do not have 
incentive to choose different profit margins for the two products.     17
Proof: The modeling implies that for each manufacturer’s product, its prices in store i and  j  
is differentiated by  ij α α − . Given the profit margins  j α ,  1,..., jn = , if the discount store 1 




  consumers of area j , 
2,..., j n = , buying from the discount store 1, no matter which brand the consumers prefer. 
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 And the other stores have profit functions of  
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,   2,..., j n = .                                    (18) 
Obviously we have 
**
1 j α α > , 2,..., j n = , which is consistent with the assumption that store 1 
is the discounter. Hence (18) represents the unique equilibrium of the market, conditional on 
1 j α α > , 2,..., jn = .  Q.E.D. 
 
In the upstream market, since the retail prices in store j are  ja a j rw s α =+ + and 
jb b j rw s α =+ +, for {1, , } jn ∈ L , the price differentials of the two manufacturers’ products 
are  ab ww −  in all stores. Bearing this in mind, we can obtain the following proposition about 
the equilibrium wholesale prices. The proof is left in Appendix   18
 
Proposition 5 The manufacturers’ equilibrium wholesale prices are 
**
ab wwc J = =+.  
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, 2,..., j n = .           (19) 
This result shows that the overall competitiveness of the market depends on the degree of 
product differentiation as well as the degree of spatial differentiation of the stores. The 
configuration of the downstream sales and profits are similar to that in the last section. The 












































, 2,..., j n = , respectively. It can also be shown that 
the discount store would drive the market prices upward if it acquires a convenience store.  
However, in the game discussed above, the discount store is not allowed to exert its 
“buyer power” in the wholesale market. This may be unreasonable since the discounter has 
rather significant market share (greater than a third in this model) in the wholesale market. To 
measure the buyer power of the discounter, it is helpful to consult the definition provided by 
Secretariat of OECD:  
(A) retailer is defined to have buyer power if, in relation to at least one supplier, it can 
credibly threaten to impose a long term opportunity cost (i.e., harmful or withheld benefit) 
which, were the threat carried out, would be significantly disproportionate to any resulting 
long term opportunity cost to itself. (Supra note 8, OECD, 1998).  
In our model, delisting a manufacturer’s product causes the same percentage loss to all   19
stores, which is between 0-50%, depending on the degree of product substitutability. 
However, given all other stores carrying a manufacturer’s product, the discount store can 
bring significant percentage loss to the manufacturer if it delists the manufacturer’s product, 
because it has substantial market share in the upstream market. But the convenience stores 
are unable to do that. Hence according to the definition of buyer power above, the discount 
store has much greater buyer power than the convenience stores in the upstream market.  
There are many different ways for a discount store to capitalize its buyer power (Dobson 
(2005)). One of the important ones is requiring “channel fees” from manufacturers. Since the 
convenience stores have much weaker buyer power, I assume the convenience stores are 
unable to demand channel fees without loss of generality. Channel fees are often positively 
related to transaction volumes, but can be lump sum fees too. I will focus on the fees that are 
linear to transaction volumes.
8  
The game with channel fees is defined as: First, the manufacturers announce their 
wholesale prices. As the same time, the manufacturers and the discount store negotiate over 
the terms of channel fees. Second, the stores order products from the manufacturers and 
determine their retail profit margins. At the same time, the manufacturers pay the channel 
fees to the discounter. Finally, the consumers enter the market and determine which store to 
go and which brand to buy.  
Suppose that the discount store demands δ  per unit of channel fee for both products. 
Given the wholesale prices  a w  and  b w , the retail prices of the two products are 
                                                        
8 The linear channel fees can be viewed as one type of price discrimination. Under the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, price 
discrimination can be illegal in the United States. But this Act can hardly be enforced in many situations. Channel fees are 
often demanded under the name of slotting allowances, which are viewed as legal in the United States so far.    20
1 a ws δ α −++ and  1 b ws δ α − ++  respectively in the discount store, and they are  aj ws α ++  
and  bj ws α ++ ,  2,..., jn = , in the convenience stores. Note that the price differentials of the 
two products are  ba ww −  within each store, and the price differentials between store 1 and 
store  j  are  1 j α αδ −+  for both products. These features make it easy to obtain following 
results. The proof of Corollary 3 is skipped since it is straightforward.  
 
Proposition 6 If the discount store is able to extract linear channel fee of δ per product unit 
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while those of the convenience stores are  
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,   2,..., j n = . 
The other parts of the proof are easy. I omit the details.  Q.E.D. 
 
Corollary 3 The linear channel fees of the discount store raise the discount store’s profit 
margin, market share and profit. On the contrary, the fees lower the convenience stores’ profit 
margins, market shares and profits. The channel fees of the discount store have exclusionary 
effects against the convenience stores since they raise those stores’ stock costs. 
 
Proposition 7 If the discount store is able to extract linear channel fee of δ per product unit 
from the manufacturers, the equilibrium wholesale prices become 
**
ab wwJ c k δ == + +,                                                          (26) 
where k is the market share of the discount store. The manufacturers’ profits are unaffected by 
the linear channel fees.  









buy product a and the others buy product b. Manufacturer a’s profit is  
() aa w π =
11 11
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ab wJ w c k δ =+ + + .                                                      (28) 




ba wJ w c k δ =+ + + .                                                      (29) 
We can solve the equilibrium wholesale prices from (28) and (29), which are    22
**
ab wwJ c k δ == + +. 
Each manufacturer’s profit is 
2
n
[( ) ( 1 ) ( ) ]
2
nJ
kJ k k J k δδ δ +−+ − + =,                                    (30) 
which is unaffected by the linear channel fees.  Q.E.D. 
 
If the discount store exerts its buyer power through requiring linear channel fees, the real 
wholesale prices faced by the discount store become Jck δ δ + +−  for both products, but the 
convenience stores face wholesale prices of Jck δ + + . Compared to the wholesale prices in 
Proposition 5, we see that the channel fees actually raise the stock costs of the convenience 
stores. It is the convenience stores and their consumers that in fact bear the burden of the fees. 
Hence linear channel fees of large discount store have exclusionary effects against other 
stores. The consequence is similar to the “raising rivals’ costs” effect suggested by Salop and 
Scheffman (1983). Finally, we can derive following result from Proposition 6 and 7.  
 
Proposition 8 Given the market structure, the linear channel fee lowers the average retail 
price, as long as the rate of the fee,δ , is not too large.  
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The average retail prices with the channel fee is  
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. Hence the average retail price goes down when δ  
is not too large.  Q.E.D. 
 
Linear channel fees divert some sales from the high-price convenience stores to the 
discount store. Hence allowing the discounter store to exert buyer power in the upstream 
market tends to lower the average retail price. This result is consistent with Galbraith 
(1952)’s “countervailing power” argument. My model suggests that countervailing power 
arises not because of retailer concentration, but the buyer power of discount retailers in 
wholesale market. Furthermore, the “countervailing power” found in this paper may not   24
benefit the consumers as a whole. Channel fees increase the price gaps between the discount 
store and the convenience stores, which means the consumers have to pay more 
transportation costs. The extra transportation costs may cancel out the consumers’ savings 
from the lower average retail prices. Also because of the increased transportation costs, the 
social welfare decreases when the discounter exerts buyer power in the upstream market. 
Dynamically, channel fees lead to greater market share for the discount store, which 
would enhance the discounter’s buyer power in the upstream. And greater buyer power 
allows it to obtain greater rate of channel fees. And that would again raise its market share 
and profit. This is what Dobson (2005) called virtuous circle for the discount retailers and the 
vicious circle for the convenience stores. The exclusionary effect of the channel fees is also 
enhanced in the circle.  The market would eventually reach an equilibrium at the limit.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
A striking feature of modern retail industries is the polarization of store sizes. Most of the 
powerful retailers are discount stores. This is paradox because economists typically believe 
that powerful firms in an industry should enjoy greater profit margins, but that is not the case 
in retail industries. Theoretic study about discount stores is scarce in the literature. The major 
contributions of this paper are to demonstrate why a discount store is profitable and how it 
exerts market power. In the first model of this paper, I show why a powerful retailer may find 
it profitable to undercut their competitors’ prices. Intuitively, because a discount store offers 
the lowest price, all consumers who have low enough transportation costs would buy from 
the discounter rather than any other stores. The discounter can thus sell much more and earn   25
more profit than the other stores. The model also suggests that the overall market price may 
go up when a discount store acquires a competing convenience store.  
The second model of this paper considers a bilateral oligopoly where a discount store can 
exert buying power in the upstream market. I show that the discounter actually uses linear 
“channel fees” as a tool to capitalize its buying power. The burden of the linear channel fees 
is in fact on the shoulders of the convenience stores and their customers, but not the upstream 
manufacturers. Interestingly, given the market structure, linear channel fees tend to lower the 
average retail price in the market. This result partially supports the “countervailing power” 
argument of Galbraith (1952). Particularly, the model suggests that the “countervailing 
power” arises not because of retailer concentration, but the buyer power of the discount 
retailer in wholesale market. However, the “countervailing power” only benefits the 
discounter and some of the consumers. Its overall impact on the social welfare is negative 
because it increases the consumers’ transportation costs. On the other hand, linear channel 
fees lower the discounter’s stock costs but raise those of the convenience stores. Hence the 
channel fees raise the discounters’ profits and market share while lower those of the other 
stores. In this sense, requiring channel fees may be regarded as an exclusionary strategy of 
the discount store. Regarding antitrust practice, this paper prefers the position of the United 
States to that of the United Kingdom. It suggests that the concentration in retail industries 
tends to hurts the economies.  
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Apparently, the inequalities hold strictly if  1 ss < .  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: The new store 1 chooses 
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And if  s s < 1 , the inequalities hold strictly.  Q.E.D. 
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(1). The average retail price before the merger is 
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The average retail price after the merger is 
** ** ** **
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q q  holds for any  1 n ≥ .   
(4). (Straightforward). Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5: The retail price differentials of the two products are the same in all 
stores, because the stores put the same profit margins on the two products. As long as 





 consumers  who 
prefer brand b to buy brand a product. Hence the profit functions of the manufacturers are 

























ba wJ w c = ++  
respectively. Hence in equilibrium we have 
**
ab wwc J = =+. Q.E.D. 
 